Armenia within the triangle of politico-cultural aspirations towards Europe, geopolitical security imperatives, and the need to comply with the western system of values

European integration has been set as one of the foreign policy priorities of Armenia. The country has been a member of the Council of Europe (CE) since January 2001, and was included in June 2004 in the European Union's (EU) "Expanded Europe, New Neighborhood" program, together with its immediate neighbors Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian leadership has repeatedly expressed the desire to become a full-fledged member of the EU in the future.

The EU has long ceased to be solely an economic union, and even though it has not yet succeeded in creating its own security and defense system, it has its own collective interests in security, and 19 out of its 25 members are at the same time NATO members. Under such circumstances it should have been logical for every country seeking European integration to look for security guarantees within the Euro-Atlantic and European circles first. Authorities in Yerevan have declared on several occasions, however, that joining NATO is not a target that Armenia sets for itself, at least for the time being. On the contrary, with respect to its security, Armenia looks nowadays towards the north. In fact, shortly after independence in the early 1990's, Yerevan worked out strategic relations with Russia to address adequately its own security needs. Later on, Armenia joined the Collective Security Treaty signed by a number of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which became in turn the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), regrouping six former Soviet Republics.

Before dwelling upon other aspects of European integration for Armenia, it is therefore necessary to clarify this security phenomenon, which might seem odd and paradoxical at first sight.

Armenia's difficult quest: Political future in Europe, security guarantees through Russia

The fact that Armenia looked north and picked Russia as a guarantor of its security was been conditioned by geopolitical factors, and above all, by the very existence of both the Karabakh conflict and neighboring Turkey. Today, US and NATO global security projects ascribe a particularly significant role to Turkey and to Azerbaijan within the South Caucasian section of the "Central Asia - Caspian Region - Turkey" axis. Under such circumstances, to become completely part of the Western security system means to accept the strategic role to be played by these two countries in the South Caucasus. This is something Armenia cannot afford.

Armenia's choice of Russia as a guarantor of its security has been hitherto met with understanding by Western countries, and today, normally developing relations unite Yerevan to several Western capitals. Moreover, aware of the consistent dwindling of Russian influence in the region in recent years, matched on the opposite side by the growing strategic interests of the United States and NATO within the same region, Armenia has been gradually establishing cooperation with the Western security system. Behind this rather new Armenian trend one can also find the dictates of another strategic concern: Armenia does not wish to lag behind Azerbaijan and Georgia in this respect. Actually, today, in terms of the development of its security relations with the US and especially with the Atlantic Alliance, Armenia does not lag significantly behind either one of its two neighbors, except for the fact that it still does not express any wish to put joining NATO on its agenda. Nevertheless, cooperation with the West still comes second compared to cooperation with Russia. "The Armenian-Russian strategic alliance has no alternative today," declared Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan in December 2004.

Various layers of this policy dubbed "complementary" by Armenia have not contradicted each other yet, as far as security is concerned. But the picture may change if US-Russia relations or EU-Russia relations take a sharp turn for the worse, or if the US military presence in the region is activated and that country resorts to specific operations there. At this point in time, the strategic alliance between Armenia and Russia also does not contradict in essence Armenia's trend toward European integration, "especially in case of closer relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union," as Sargsyan noted in December. Such a contradiction may arise if Armenia actually becomes a candidate for membership in the EU, an event that does not exist yet on the EU's agenda, for the near future at least.

Nonetheless, the gap between the future affiliation and the strategic choice of a development model on the one hand, and the choice of a security system on the other, despite efforts to bridge it, remains a fact which can not continue to exist forever.

However, even if all the other obstacles are lifted, Armenia and Azerbaijan will not become EU members as long as the Karabakh conflict remains unresolved. With the resolution of the conflict however, one of the main factors engendering the above-mentioned gap will have been removed.

Foreign policy & security choices and the Armenian political arena

What different standpoints can one encounter in the Armenian political arena with regard to various integration and security choices? We can recognize two trends within the foreign policy of Armenia which do not give rise to significant dissension in the political arena of the country. These are the general perceptions and principles underlying the Armenian drive towards European integration and relations with Iran. Political parties represented in parliament and a significant number of parties and forces outside parliament agree with the drive toward integrating the country within European structures, though disagreements exist when it comes to deciding the degree of this integration and the ways to achieve it. A near consensus exists also as far as the maintenance of the normal and friendly relations established with Iran since Armenia's independence is concerned. These relations do not incorporate the present security system of Armenia as such. Iran is however an extremely important neighbor for Armenia, and the strategic value of friendly relations with Iran is multiplied under the present circumstances of the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Indeed, Armenia will be reduced to an extremely unpleasant situation if US-Iran relations attain the level of serious confrontation.

But the standpoints of the authorities concerning orientation towards Russia or towards the west are differently perceived by various groupings of the political arena. Previously, pro-Russian, and sometimes even unconditionally pro-Russian forces formed the great majority within both pro-government and opposition ranks. But a number of factors have shaken up this situation in the last one or two years. During the 2003 elections, the unconditionally pro-Russian section of the opposition was revolted by Russia's support of Robert Kocharyan. The pro-government and opposition political activists and forces alike express their disappointment and their revulsion by the fact that on different occasions Russia did not behave like a real strategic partner of Armenia. For example, during discussions on the Karabakh question in international organizations, representatives of Russia never backed Armenian approaches, while it happened that they supported Azerbaijani approaches. In September - October 2004, while struggling to re-assess its relations with Georgia, as a pressure card, Russia unilaterally closed the border passage of Upper Lars, completely indifferent to the fact that in doing so it was causing worse harm to Armenia and the hundreds of Armenians crowded at the passage-point. Lately, the fact that Moscow is unable to maintain its own positions on the territory of the ex-Soviet Union, while the West, and especially the United States, are penetrating without hindrance that same territory, has aroused some doubts among those who previously, in terms of security, saw no alternative for Armenia except Russia. As a result, the previous trust Armenian political circles placed on Russia has been shaken over the last one or two years. An inclination to lean towards the West can already be noticed among a certain segment of the opposition (a wing of the Republic Party, the National Unification Party, and the People's Party). Others still remain pro-Russian, with numerous questions in mind, however. But there are also unconditionally pro-Western forces which form a minority (the Armenian Pan-National Movement, the Liberal Progressive Party) and which insist, on the contrary, that Armenia's integration into the European structures and more specifically into NATO is the only guarantee to completely ensure the country's security. They demand quitting CSTO, believing that Russia has not historically guaranteed Armenia's security and pointing to the fact that Western structures are penetrating the region all the same, and Armenia would be the only loser if it does not move swiftly. However, even politicians not endowed with a pro-Russian reputation, such as Vazgen Manukyan, object that Armenia cannot afford to adopt an exclusively pro-Russian, exclusively pro-European, or exclusively pro-American foreign policy.

European integration as a strategic choice

"Understanding problems and lag of perceptions have always existed [between European and Caucasian decision-makers], however, the main one [problem] is the short-term approach of the Caucasian decision-makers who in general wish to draw profit from the relations with the EU on material, financial and political prestige grounds, while Europeans stay on a long-term perspective to bring about real political and economic change. This lag is dwindling, but the common choice to move forward in the same direction remains the problem. We do not know if the choice made by the three countries of the South Caucasus to advance towards Europe is genuine or rhetorical only."

These are the words of Damien Helly, an independent researcher from Brussels and the former director of the "Caucasus" project of the International Crisis Group.

And in fact, what do the South Caucasus states expect from European integration, and in this case Armenia, its leadership and its people?

And what does Europe expect from us?

Despite the truth of the remarks concerning the narrow self-interests of decision-makers or the tendency to avoid the implementation of the required, even the most elementary, standards, and finally despite the allowed numerous violations in this last respect, according to a deeper, more comprehensive analysis, Armenia's aspiration for European integration is dictated by serious strategic expectations. Besides the dream of tasting the advantages of "the well-to do European way of life", in a situation full of uncertainties created by globalization trends accompanied by savage liberalism, European integration offers countries like Armenia, which have not reached stability through development, the chance to live in an environment endowed with a relatively safe stability. On the other hand, as mentioned before, under the present geopolitical conditions, an exclusively Western choice for a security system does not resolve the problems of Armenia's national security. Nonetheless, a simultaneous adherence to the EU together with neighboring countries (of course if this common aspiration comes true for each of these countries) will represent an important guarantee of security for Armenia, because, simultaneous accession will most likely provide regional stability. Besides these expectations of a strategic and long-term nature, in the short-term, the close relations of Armenia with the European structures can contribute to avoiding isolation, to keeping communications open with international structures, to developing the economy, science and culture, to increasing the possibilities of solving existing problems with Turkey, etc.

To benefit from the advantages offered by an adherence to the EU, or, in a more general sense by European integration, Armenia and the other countries to be integrated must of course strictly implement the standards defined by these structures. Besides the necessity of the implementation of these standards, the possibility of future European integration is of course highly dependent on the EU's political decision to expand its borders.

For closer relations, concisely, European structures require: 1/ implementation of democratic values, institutions, and freedoms; 2/ liberal free market, and in the case of adherence to the EU, a developed economy as well; and 3/ tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In this context, the most complicated impediments hindering Armenia's integration into the EU are the low level of democracy, the existence of numerous obstacles standing in the way of free competition in the sphere of market relations, along with the low level of the development of the economy, and the unresolved Karabakh conflict. Another specific European requirement is the closing down of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Station, which provides at the present time up to 40% of the electricity of the Republic of Armenia.

Coincidences and Debatable Standards in the Value System

Despite these hindrances, in terms of civilization, for Armenia and the Armenian people the European choice for a political family is based on serious and objective foundations. In many elements of its system of ethno-cultural values, in its geographical location (at the junction of the East-West axis), in its numerous historical and cultural ties with the west, in its Christian faith, and in the existence of an important Armenian Diaspora in western countries as well, in many senses, Armenia and the Armenian people are closer than others to European values.

Other factors in turn have a restraining effect. Indeed, in addition to the Western European influences which have created similarities between Armenians and Europeans, other factors, dissimilar in nature, have also left their influence on the Armenian people, thus shaping its national character, which differs from the Western-European character in certain aspects and has its own specificity. Among these are a certain conservatism in social relations, the high value imparted to the nuclear family, as well as the important role played by the Apostolic Church of Armenia in Armenian history on the one hand and the influence left by a number of Eastern, Russian-Slavonic, "Caucasian" and Soviet values and mores on the other. An important factor which creates some difficulties in the European integration process is the difficulty of accepting or sometimes the outright rejection of some European standards by an important segment of Armenian society and by a non- negligible number of representatives of the political arena. Basic democratic principles such as free elections, the right of the majority to rule, the protection of minority rights, the respect for fundamental democratic freedoms -freedom of speech, of faith, of conscience, of gathering, etc., the respect for human rights and so on, which have taken root in the West in the course of the last three centuries and have already received universal sonority are not the issue here. The issue here are those principles which have been adopted by Western Europeans during the last 30 -35 years only, and which the Council of Europe and consequently the European Union require their members to adopt without questioning. These are the abolishment of capital punishment, which was still being exercised in many European countries until the beginning of the 1980's and is still practiced in the USA, the decriminalization of homosexuality, which took effect in England and Wales in 1967 and only in 1993 in the Irish Republic, and the free registration and functioning of some religious sects perceived as "dangerous" by wide layers of Armenian society.

Standards of this category are considered to be exotic within the Armenian environment in the sense that they are dictated to newly developing societies which do not respect many basic rights, the implementation of which must in fact precede these "exotic" standards. Of these are a minimal standard of living and the basic right of everyone to education, all of which took root in the West a very long time ago, well before the implementation of the "exotic" standards.

And to conclude, some data from a public opinion poll conducted on the issue of Armenia's accession to the EU: According to the latest public survey conducted by the Armenian Center of Strategic and National Studies (ACSNS), 64% of the approximately 2000 citizens questioned throughout the republic were in favor of Armenia's membership in the EU, 11.8% were against it, and up to 24.2% found it hard to take sides for or against. 29.4% of the participants in the poll perceived membership as an improvement of the economic situation, 16.7% perceived it as a way to find a fair settlement for the Karabakh conflict, and 7.3% perceived it as an improvement of the national security. 30% expressed their concern with respect to the possible loss of the attributes of statehood and of national identity as a result of an accession to the EU, but as many as 52.9% of the participants had no such concern.