"I am Georgian, and therefore I am European."

Zurab Zhvania 
(From his speech on the occasion of Georgia's accession to the Council of Europe, January 28, 1999, Strasbourg)

"Carthaginem esse delendam" (Carthage should be destroyed) - these are the words that concluded every single speech of Cato the Elder in the Roman Senate. "Georgia should join NATO!" were the words repeated by one of the leaders of the National Liberation Movement of Georgia, Irakli Tserteli, throughout the late 1980's and 1990's. For ten years, this sounded like either a practical joke or the Utopian dream of an eccentric politician. But when President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze officially announced Georgia's desire to join NATO at the November Summit in Prague, Tsereteli could be triumphant. The strategic political aim of Georgia was announced to be full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, in particular joining NATO and the European Union in the shortest time possible. Georgia directly connects its national independence, security, and political and economic development with NATO and the EU.

In connection with this, a significant fact should be mentioned. Not long before NATO's November 2002 Summit in Prague, the representatives of the leading NGOs and media outlets in Georgia presented a collaborative declaration calling on President Shevardnadze "to absolutely express the will of our nation to join NATO." Of course, it is not this declaration that will decide whether Georgia will become a member of NATO or how soon, but it was the expression of a wide public and political consensus, a rare occasion in Georgia, at least on one (but fundamental) question on the policy and strategy of the country. Even the evidently left parties who are considered pro-Russian (who, by the way, do not play a crucial role in Georgian politics) did not dare to openly express their dissent to the decision made, so explicitly does the short history of the new independence of Georgia demonstrate that the country can connect the real safeguarding of its security with NATO.

The Rose Revolution that took place in Georgia a year after the Prague Summit cast doubt on many of Eduard Shevardnadze's actions in his twelve years as the head of the independent Georgian state, but his moves towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures were not among them. Moreover, with the new state power this policy is reasoned not only by the needs of safeguarding national security and the geo-political situation but also by the value categories, when the full membership of Georgia in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures is viewed as a natural and civilizational haven for the people of Georgia, for which they have been yearning for centuries.

In 2004 Georgia coordinated the plan of action on nearing the alliance (the so-called IPAP) with NATO. Work on the individual partnership scheme with the European Union started in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) launched in June 2004 for the countries of the South Caucasus. A position of a State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration appeared in the Cabinet. The reforms in the army as well as the funding of the Ministry of Defense attained a qualitatively new level when compared with that in the Shevardnadze period.

However, it should be said in all fairness that the Western vector in the foreign policy of Georgia had already taken shape in the time of Shevardnadze. In 1999 Georgia was the first among the South Caucasus countries to join the Council of Europe and the World Trade Organization (the latter marked the factual expansion of the economic space of the CIS). This was when Georgia stopped its participation in the Treaty of the Collective Security of the CIS countries (the so-called TCS, and subsequently OTCS). By 2001, the Border Department of Georgia had completely taken control over the whole perimeter of the state border. The American program "Train and Equip", which cost 64 million dollars and was launched in 2002, can be considered a phase-marking phenomenon in the sense of bringing Georgia closer to the NATO military standards. In the framework of this program, the American instructors adequately equipped and trained four battalions of the Georgian army. Assistance in various forms has also been given to Georgia by other member states of the North Atlantic alliance starting with its immediate neighbor, Turkey, and finishing with the Baltic states, which have just joined NATO themselves. Georgia determinedly and immediately supported the operation in Afghanistan and became a member of the anti-Saddam coalition in Iraq; Georgian military officers are in service as part of the corresponding forces in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

However, Georgia's way to NATO and EU is not at all strewn with revolutionary roses, and there exist many internal and external hindrances, overcoming which preconditions the speed and success of our achieving the long desired goal.

Georgian-Russian Relations

At the December 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, an agreement was achieved between Georgia and Russia on the withdrawal of two of the four Russian military bases, a Soviet heritage, located in the territory of Georgia by June 2001 and on negotiations to be held with the purpose of rapid identification of the withdrawal time of the other two. At this point the situation is as follows: the Russian base in Vasiani (near Tbilisi) has been dismantled; with respect to the base in Gudauta (Abkhazia), Russia asserts that it has been turned into a rehabilitation center for the Russian peacemakers. The Georgian side insists on international inspection with Georgia's own participation, but no agreements have been achieved yet on the withdrawal of the bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki. However, according to the opinion shared by the experts, these bases are not of any significance from the military point of view (that is, the more or less usable armament and technology have already been moved from Akhalkalaki to the Russian base in Armenia), but together with the Russian peacemaking contingent in the conflict zones in Abkhzia and South Ossetia they are prolonging the Russian military presence in Georgia, hindering its integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. Moreover, the presence of the Russian military bases in Georgia does not have any legal ground (in contrast to the base in Gyumri in Armenia and the Gabala Radar Station in Azerbaijan), and Russia's intractability on the bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi for more than five years since the Istanbul arrangements seriously clouds the already complicated Georgian-Russian relationship.

It also remain complicated because at the end of 2004 Russia blocked the prolonging of the OSCE observers' mission mandate in the Ingush-Chechen-Daghestan fragment of the Russian-Georgian border, which in the light of the numerous statements by Russian officials about the possibility of taking preventive measures against the Chechen militias beyond their own territory has been considered an explicit threat by Georgia.

People are also dissatisfied by the position and actions (or inaction) of the Russian "blue helmets" in the conflict zone, in Abkhazia most of all. However, the peacemakers proper are only a link in the chain of the hostile steps that characterizes Russia's policy towards Georgia (mass Russian naturalization of the whole population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, manipulations with visa and border regimes, arbitrariness regarding customs and smuggling, direct interference in the process of the formation of power, as happened in the presidential elections in Abkhazia in the fall of 2004, and so on). Finally, Georgia remains the only country in the CIS with whom Russia has not concluded a so-called "Framework" Treaty on good-neighbor relations and cooperation. That is why it is not surprising that Georgia's European choice has completely been formed as something with no alternative, and that is why Georgian society sees no other system of security but NATO, and no other possibility for stable development and prosperity but being a member of the EU.

Internal Problems

Among these, in the first place, should be mentioned the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At present it is hard to imagine that the European Union will open its doors to a country that is so hampered with such a heavy burden. And even though the peaceful initiatives of President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili on the regulation of the situation in South Ossetia presented in Strasburg in January 2005 were accepted with approval by the global democratic community, the understanding that no small distance lies between an initiative and concrete decisions exists in all places. Moreover, the events in South Ossetia in the summer of 2004, when the tension reached its climax and very importantly, because of the ineffective strategy in the actions of the new government in Georgia inter alia, did not enhance the growth of mutual trust between the parties.

According to the common opinion, the Abkhazian matter is harder, as here the degree of alienation between the Georgians and the Abkhaz is even higher. The mixed messages which Abkhazian society is receiving from the Georgian government do not stimulate the process of reconsidering the reliability of the selected spatial and temporal orienteer, which should naturally have started in Abkhazian society after the shameless interference of Russia in the electoral campaign in the fall of 2004.

From the viewpoint of many local and international experts, the Constitutional Law on the Status of Ajaran Autonomy passed in Georgia in June 2004, which has brought the autonomy of Ajara to a symbolic level, can be counterproductive for the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the Georgian powers have been pointing at the notorious asymmetry in the approaches with respect to Ajara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, which is confirmed, by the way, by the nature of the presidential initiatives on South Ossetia.

A most important factor in the success of the regulation of the conflicts in the territory of Georgia, and in its faint Europe-bound efforts in general, is the dynamic of the development of the country. Following the Shevardnadze period stagnation, this very dynamic in the post-revolutionary period has appeared, but it is characterized by many contradictions. In particular, in respect to NATO integration, a feeling has appeared that the new Georgian government prioritizes the purely military aspects at the expense of the political, legal, and economic aspects and in the end, at the expense of the democratic compatibility with NATO standards, let alone the standards of the European Union. The spirit of a kind of experimentalism dominates in high places; the lack of long-term strategic programs of action in various spheres, and among them a clear vision of the constitutional structure of the country, is being reviewed. The rule of law, an independent judicial system, self-government, and the observation of human rights and freedoms is not a complete list of the most important spheres where the Georgian reality is still far from European standards. The level of political culture of the new (revolutionary) political elite as well as that of the society in general also leaves a lot to be desired. We can state that the resolution passed in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2005 rather correctly reflected the numerous problems that the Georgian state and society are facing. However, the critical pathos of this resolution at this stage seems more promising than disappointing; it is likely that they are starting to take Georgia seriously and they think that it is able to deal with various problems.

International Cooperation

It is quite evident however that without serious, systematic, and diverse (political, diplomatic, financial, and expert) assistance from its western partners and allies, Georgia will have great difficulties. That assistance is fortunately being given, and since the Rose Revolution it has acquired new momentum. It is important that the effectiveness of this assistance increases and that the authorities in Georgia get clear and simple messages (which should not be kept secret from society) evaluating their activity in order to come closer to the standards of NATO and the EU.

In fact, for some years this clarity has been lacking. Sometimes there has been a feeling that the Americans were trying to squeeze Georgia into NATO and the EU, and Europeans were opposing it with all their might. Besides, if the Americans' voice counts in NATO and is quite close to being the decisive opinion, in the EU there is a different situation. That is why the road to NATO seems shorter in Georgia than the road to the EU. It looks like neither in Brussels nor in Tbilisi is there clarity on the essence of the Neighbor Policy: is it a very narrow and crooked path, like the one that leads to unification with Europe, or is it a refined diplomatic suggestion not to sneak in with our problems when there are already enough problems without ours?

However, the situation is changing quite fast: Ukraine's Orange Revolution can, on the one hand, push Georgia into the shade, Ukraine being a more significant partner, but on the other, it can give a new impulse to European interest in the Post-Soviet space. And in the light of Bulgaria's and Romania's joining the EU in 2007 and the decision of the start of the corresponding process for Turkey, there arises a real prospect for the Black Sea to become an inter-European sea and for the expansion of a united Europe to its organic borders to the South-East. In this sense the rise in the representation of the countries of the former "Socialist camp" to NATO and EU is promising. It is easier for them to understand the aspirations of their colleagues in the Soviet misfortune, in the aspiration of securing themselves against the vice-like grip of the borderless Eurasian neighbor.

Finally from the viewpoint of the fight against terrorism as well as Europe's attachment to supplementary resources of energy located to the east of Georgia, the South Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular have taken on increasing significance.

The Region

The disorder in the matters in the South Caucasus is an obvious hindrance for the integration of the states of the region into Europe (either together, or one by one, or by another format). Each of the South Caucasus countries has tense relations with at least one of its neighbors (Georgia with Russia, Armenia with Turkey, and Azerbaijan with Iran) and correspondingly, Armenia is maintaining strategic partnership with Russia and Iran, and Azerbaijan with Turkey. Georgian President Saakashvili announced in his speech in the Parliament on February 11, 2005 that "Georgia has ideal and idyllic relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia," but there is no confidence in the mutuality of the feelings in all three cases. The factual lack of positive dynamics in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict not only holds the immediately involved parties in tension but also makes the regional security ephemeral and practically excludes full-scale regional cooperation. Up to now there has been no success in developing a really feasible project common to all three countries of the South Caucasus and attractive to Europe (although as the author of this article has found out, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is preparing a proposal in this direction). In such a situation deepened with the serious identification, inner political and other differences among Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the so desired and acceptable concept of the "region" as applied to the South Caucasus probably retains only geographic content. Proceeding from this, a necessity for a differentiated approach on the part of EU (and NATO) to the countries in the region has arisen in Georgia, the signs of which will most likely be expressed in the "Neighborhood Policy."

Thus, each of the countries of the South Caucasus has its own route towards a united Europe. For Georgia, which neither has nor wants another choice and which is taking steps along this route, it could be said that there is no way back.

February 2005