Rasim Musabekov: Hindrances to European integration

The hindrances in the way of integration of the South Caucasus into the European structures can arbitrarily be differentiated into three groups: internal, regional and geopolitical. Everything is clear regarding the internal hindrances: politics, the socio-economic lag, the weakness of institutions of government and civil society, the high rate of corruption, the incompliance of the military forces with modern standards, and other things all together create negative baggage which makes it hard to squeeze into the developed Western and European economic space, to be integrated into the system of military and political cooperation and security. As to the regional factors impeding European integration, I would put the existent conflicts and the danger of their unfreezing and the transition into the "heated" phase in first place. The EU and NATO have enough to worry about with their own problems (Cyprus and Northern Ireland already cost a lot, and also the disputes around Gibraltar, and so on). That is why Brussels is not eager to undertake the burden of resolving the South Caucasian conflicts. Secondly, there is the fact of the various vectors of the geopolitical orientation of the South Caucasian states, as a result of the conflicts and the severance of regional cooperation and collaboration. And finally, such influential states as Russia and Iran, undoubtedly, are doing what they can overtly or covertly to at least impede the process of the integration of the South Caucasian states into the European structures to the greatest possible extent, if not to block the process completely. Russia does not by any means want to accept the loss of the zone that was under its own exclusive domination for two centuries, and Iran fears the appearance of the hostilely perceived Western influence, particularly the military infrastructure of NATO, near its borders. In total, all these factors create a sad picture with regards to the prospect of the European integration of our countries. However, they should not be considered insurmountable. It is all a matter of will, correct strategy, and subtle understanding of the time factor, which Alexander Iskandaryan spoke of yesterday.

Archil Gheghesgidze: to Musabekov and Rusetski

Institutional integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures should not be an ultimate goal and an end in itself. The goal should be the provision of a long-term and irreversible process of modernization and the creation of a democratic political system. A question arises: how necessary is integration into European structures in order to achieve these goals? Integration into NATO is vital for Georgia. As to the EU, even the process of rapprochement itself (regardless of how prolonged it is) within a rational policy can provide considerable progress towards the achievement of the above-mentioned goal.

Alexander Iskandaryan

I agree with Rasim Musabekov: these are the hindrances and they are numerous. But there is hope. Great Britain has a conflict, Cyprus does not control the territory of the non-acknowledged state, Slovakia does not comply in its economic level, Bulgaria has more corruption than we do, and Romania.I will refrain from speaking of that country. Sexual minorities are not treated in Portugal the way they are in Amsterdam, and Corleans differ from people in Stockholm in the wideness of their grins and the quality of their water. But that's nothing - they are all in the EU or will join it in 2007. And we will be accepted if needed. But is it needed? Are we worth anything? In terms of geography, communication, or any thing else? This is an issue that concerns them, they who accept. As for us, we who want to be accepted, it is obvious that the EU or NATO is something like Santa Claus to us. He will come and pour everything we don't have out of his sack. Democracy, security, prosperity, freedom. We are used to someone else making decisions for us. We have been part of one empire or another for too long a time. I think we should start solving the problems. Ourselves. Then it's possible that we'll be accepted into the EU.

I am sometimes painfully ashamed, to tell the truth, when somewhere in Brussels our people (no matter who - Armenians, Georgians, or Azerbaijani) make every effort to explain to a certain small cog in the bureaucracy machine that the Caucasus is extremely important to Europe and has belonged to it since ancient times, and that person doesn't know where on the globe it is. Hence the answer to the question: integration for security or vice versa? Neither. To be more precise, both, if we are to remain an infant. The tendency is very dangerous. We should grow up, and acquire a foreign policy. A real one. "Russia is the bogeyman" and "Russia is our mother" - these are expressions of the same thing-infantilism. Russia is a neighbor, just like Europe. With all its interests, drawbacks, and parameters. Neither a Daddy nor a Mommy, just a neighbor. A big neighbor. A powerful one. And the EU is not "a commonwealth of values", but a powerful bureaucratic machine. And you join it not for the sake of democracy but with the aim of getting something for yourself.

Alexander Rusetski: The borders of the Caucasus

I think that the question "Where are the borders of the Caucasus?" is an interesting one. Some think that they are more to the North, some think that more to the South, and others consider it to be the territory between Scythia and India. We should not refuse to have a regional policy; there are too many positive things in it. However, in order to have a regional policy, the borders of the region should be identified. After this we can talk about regional security, and not like Emerson does. The second problem consists of the fact that we are not yet capable of speaking seriously of the formation of a regional policy in the Caucasus, as we do not have an adequate or unified understanding of national security within the borders of our countries individually. Even in homogeneous Armenia opinions vary. In multiethnic societies, national security should be presented as a set of "ethnic securities", which does not exist either in Georgia or in Azerbaijan. The sum of the "ethnic securities" should equal "civil security" (under circumstances of civil and not ethnic democracy). And the latter should be the basis for the formation of national security. Today the ethnic understanding of security dominates and this is only logical, as the ethnocentric perception and understanding of the surrounding world dominates.

Besides, this situation is actively supported externally, as it is the cheapest way to control the situation.

Stepan Grigoryan: to Avyaz Rustamov

In Armenia there are a lot of politicians, political scientists and public figures who are rather suspicious of the West (and the USA first of all), thinking that the West is only interested in the oil in our region. If this were true, then the role of Azerbaijan in the region would be incomparably higher than what we can observe today.

We are glad that there is a consensus on the issue of Georgia's place in the world and its security system among the Georgian political elite. At least, interviews with the leaders of the political parties show that Georgian politicians see Georgia in the European family of nations and they connect their security with NATO. In Armenia's case things are more complicated. You will come across various visions of Armenia's place in the world among various political forces. There are a lot of reasons for this: starting with the difficult historical past, the complicated internal policy situation, and finishing with the influence of the "outside factors" on the position of Armenia, such as the Armenian Diaspora in various countries of the world. That is why I will try to present my own vision of the "Armenian project."

First, this is the task of creating reliable guarantees for the physical security of the Armenian people. Not isolation but on the contrary, cooperation with all the countries of the region, including Turkey, is needed for this. In this context NATO is of unquestionable interest, not only as the most powerful organization in the world in the sphere of defense and security but also as an organization Turkey is a member of NATO. NATO can become the "bridge" that will provide cooperation between Armenia and Turkey in the military field. That is the area where the stereotypes of Turkey (at least among the Armenian people) are the most fixed. The system of security of the CIS (the so-called Treaty Organization of Collective Security - TOCS (ODKB)) cannot work in the region because it is inefficient and also because only Armenia among the countries in the region is a member in this organization. Besides, if we want to see the South Caucasus region as a unity and a region of cooperation and good-neighborly relations, our countries must in the end enter a single unified system of security. And NATO can act as something like that. We very often hear that this is a very distant prospect; however, the experience of development in recent years has proven that the situation in the world is developing very fast and in the next few years many things may undergo qualitative changes. We do not need to think long to find examples: even people with the wildest imagination could not have supposed in 1989 to 1990 that the Baltic states would not only obtain independence but also become members of NATO and the EU in 2004. Only two years ago it seemed that the CIS countries had places ready as "strategic satellites" of Russia, and today at least three of those are already irreversibly "leaving for" the West. Second is the development of democracy in Armenia that would allow for the election and re-election of a legal and legitimate leadership. This is a serious test for our society. The experience of the development of electoral processes in recent years has shown that this is a constant stumbling block. This costs us a great deal, because since the government lacks legitimacy, it is incapable of conducting serious reforms within Armenia and making clear-cut decisions in foreign policy. This is where the ideas of not changing anything and flirting with everybody in foreign policy arise. This is where the idea of "freezing" conflicts and waiting for better times is born, as the weak leadership is not able to compromise (compromises are always unpopular in any society) and is extremely vulnerable to both internal and external pressure. Thirdly, there is the creation of security guarantees for the population of Nagorno Karabakh. Here it is very important to be ready to compromise and to make mutual concessions. We should be guided by the principle of "territory in exchange for security," and not by the principle of "territory in exchange for the independence of Karabakh," as the latter will only aggravate confrontation and mutual mistrust.