Hetq talks to Frédéric Encel, a professor of geopolitical sciences at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, about the ongoing fighting in Artsakh, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the situation in the region.

Mr. Ansel defends the Armenian Cause in France, but also spends a lot of time explaining the geopolitical significance of Armenia. "Taking into account the country's territory and demographics, both are very modest, but in comparison, Armenia has a very serious significance, is very interesting from a geopolitical point of view and is objectively in an interesting region," Mr. Encel said during a lecture in Armenia last year.

Mr. Encel, thank you for your time. In your opinion, why did fighting along the Karabakh-Azerbaijani Line of Contact resume at this moment?

The issue of the war schedule is remarkably interesting, I think it has to do with the balance of power. In other words, Baku considers, certainly not without reason, that the ratio of military forces is more favorable for it today than a few years ago. This was already true during the 2016 Four-Day War, but now, with the acquisition of new weapons and the support of hundreds or thousands of Turkish mercenaries, and given that Mr. Putin is clearly in no hurry to end the war and that the American ship of state has no captain,  Azerbaijani authorities were convinced that war was possible and that even victory was possible. And this is the reason why, in my opinion, Baku is not inclined to a real ceasefire today, as the ratio of military forces is more favorable

There is also the Turkish factor. Ankara supports Azerbaijan. Wasn't the geopolitical situation also favorable, in particular, the fact that the great powers are busy with their own problems, such as Russia, which is concerned about the situation in Belarus, and presidential elections are scheduled in the United States? Maybe that's why Azerbaijan thought this was a good time.

It is an interesting idea. But we need to know whether Mr. Aliyev has such a serious strategic approach. I'm not sure. I think the Four-Day War took place in a context that did not include all of those factors, but that does not mean you are wrong, I do not know. I think that beyond that, there is a more serious tendency on their part, which, in fact, says the following: Armenians have not acquired new, high-efficiency military equipment in recent years, while we have such equipment due to oil wealth, in particular, military UAVs. And this is a fairly new phenomenon. Of course, you are right about the American election campaign, but let me mention or remind you that in fact Mr. Trump is inconsistent and completely incompetent. He certainly does not know where Karabakh is on the map. There is no doubt about it. So, whether there is an election campaign or not, I doubt that Aliyev counted on it. Of course, this is just a hypothesis. I am not saying that your hypothesis is wrong.

What is Russia's role in all this? Will Russia intervene, remain neutral, or go further, given that Turkey could play an important role in the Caucasus?

You know, the total volume of trade in Russia is based on a limited export economy. In other words, Russia today exports the same things that the Soviet Union exported in the 1920s: oil, natural gas, and armaments.

Why am I saying this? Because of Russia's GDP, which is equivalent to the GDP of Spain, that is, a very poor country, Russia is in dire need of an arms market. You know very well that Russia sells arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan at the same time.

Of course, there is an agreement on mutual military assistance with Armenia and there a Russian military base in Armenia. But anyway, you should know that the mutual aid agreement does not refer to Karabakh, it does not refer to Artsakh. And I think Putin is playing this card today. I do not think he is afraid of Turkey. I am sure he is not afraid of Turkey at all.

 On the flip side, he must consider that the two warring parties will need to maintain a sufficient level of armament. I do not see any other variable influencing Mr. Putin's decision in terms of his passive position. In any case, even if he seems to be more neutral for the time being, he knows very well that no pressure is expected from the United States in this region. He is the main player today and will be tomorrow. So, there is no reason to hurry.

What do you think he is waiting for?

I think Putin is waiting to see exactly how the balance of power will develop.

One of the thinkers who inspired Putin is the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. He says it. He is guided only on the basis of the balance of power, in particular military forces. Therefore, it is interesting for Mr. Putin to see who will prevail in Karabakh in the end.

At that time, if it comes, there can be two outcomes. There will be a very strong advance by Azerbaijan, breaking through the Artsakh frontline and reaching the Meghri corridor. That is, it will reach the territory of Armenia in the south.  Or there will be an Armenian counterattack, as in 1993-94, which will break out of the 1994 ceasefire border and reach into the heart of Azerbaijan.

Either the first or second scenarios will mark the endgame.    

Can the European Union, that’s to say France and Germany, play any role?

The European Union is still a potential player in the economic and financial spheres, but not in the geopolitical field.

Our Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian iwas quite right when he recently reminded the Le Monde daily that Europe, I quote him, "Europe must be geopolitical."

 In other words, Europe must be more united, but especially more aware that it must take the moral and financial blows of global politics, including sometimes military sanctions. Otherwise, Europe will not play a significant role.

Today Europe is not a player in the Caucasus, just as it is not a player in Africa, the Middle East or Asia because it does not want to be. Here, we are dealing mainly with an economic and financial player. And I have to say that in this common economy, on this continent, since the British have left, there is only one world power left, which is, of course, a medium-power state, but also a global one. It is called France.

And look at the extent to which France's position is often ridiculed. But look at how, for example, two weeks ago the French president became the leader of the European Union, when Greece and Cyprus were subjected to aggression in their respective territorial waters. See how the same president, in a sense, assumed the role of the leader of NATO, because that organization does not have a head, Mr. Trump is not a leader, it would not be serious to say such a thing. So, look at the fact that just one warship, sending about fifteen Rafale bombers in defense of Greece, prompted Mr. Erdogan to return his ships to port immediately. It is quite an interesting fact. This means that when you have a balance of power, you are taken seriously.

How dangerous is the transfer of mercenaries from Syria to the Caucasus? Different numbers are presented: 1000, 1500.

First, the existence of these mercenaries is a fact.

As for their number, I do not think they are more than a few hundred. But the problem is not the number of mercenaries.  In any case, the problem is not those mercenaries on the battlefield. The problem is more political. This means that Turkey, for the first time since 1994, intends to play a military role. Turkey cannot directly attack Armenia, for the reasons that we have just mentioned; that Armenia is under Russian protection.

And to attack a state under Russian protection, you have to be a complete idiot, which is not the case with Mr. Erdogan. He has several other shortcomings, but not this one. Therefore, the only possibility for Turkey is to send mercenaries, as it has done in Libya, as it does in Syria. Because Turkey supports mercenaries in Syria, moving them as military pieces here or there. This, by the way, already causes a political-military problem. But it cannot be considered a decisive weapon. On the contrary, I think it is a morally and ethically dirty tool. I want to say that 105 years after the Armenian Genocide, carried out by a political regime that is largely accepted by the current Republic of Turkey, even though the latter is not responsible but largely accepts the values of the 1915 Young Turks regime, to send mercenaries, who have already behaved like barbarians in Syria, against the Armenian civilian population…Well, this means something. Do you understand? And that meaning, from a moral and ethical point of view, is simply shameful.

You are also an expert on Israel. What about the role of Israel, which is the main supplier of UAVs to Azerbaijan? It’s obvious that this is a war of UAV’s.

I will say the same thing I have been saying to the media for about two weeks now, when I am asked that question, by the way, including the Israeli media. I have said that first, Israel is a sovereign state. Like any sovereign state, it has the sovereign right to sell arms to anyone. Second, the problem is that we are currently at the stage of a war that has been completely unleashed by one of the two warring parties, Azerbaijan, and that Israeli weapons are not defensive, but offensive.

And finally, the third point. This poses a more serious problem given that Israel has never recognized the Armenian Genocide. So, if you compare the last two points, I think Israel has reached the moral red line. And that is why I say to the Israelis, to whom I am not hostile at all, that they should take responsibility, at least in this area, to stop supplying weapons and ammunition to Azerbaijan.

Of course, in my opinion, they should reconsider their support for that country in general. But that is another matter. But in this case, the problem is direct.  Israeli offensive weapons are killing Armenian soldiers, as well as civilians, 105 years after the Armenian Genocide. And Israel has yet to recognize the genocide. In other words, there is a real serious problem here.

You have tweeted that there is morality even in geopolitics. Is that possible?

Not only is it possible, it exists quite often in democracies, but it is, of course, desirable.

Understand me correctly. I'm not naive. I have been teaching geopolitics for twenty-six years. What I am saying is that the fixed size of states is the interests. And this applies to all states. Hegel said that states have only interests. Nietzsche said that states are the coldest of the cold monsters.

I do not believe this, but in the end, we are not far from the truth. The problem is not here. There is a fixed size, it will remain so, the human essence is like that, and the basis of the state, philosophically speaking, is formed that way. But I think there are absolutely no commercial or strategic interests in morality. And on the other hand, there is no absolute morality. I put forward the idea of ​​decision-making variables, which may be minority, they may be small, they may be weak, but they must exist, especially in the moral and ethical sphere.

And I think that when a moral or ethical red line enters the game, the interests must be balanced, they must retreat in the face of those red lines. A while ago I told Israeli journalists, who asked me the same question, that in the 1970s and '80s Israelis, particularly Golda Meir, quite rightly complained that Europeans, I quote, "have mouths full of oil," that is, Europeans sacrificed Israel for oil interests. I told those journalists they cannot, the Israelis cannot, ignore the protestations of Armenians. “More than a hundred years after the genocide, you haven’t recognized the Armenian Genocide, while the Armenians, of course, have recognized the Shoah,” I said to them.   I told them that for the sake of their own interests they are supplying offensive weapons to a state that also denies the genocide. It is unacceptable.   

What are your predictions for resolving this situation?

I am pessimistic in the short run. That is, until the inauguration of the new U.S. president. If it’s Trump, it will be catastrophic. If it’s it is Joe Biden, it will be the same. I am not sure that after his inauguration, which will be at the end of January, imagine the end of January, it will be his priority. Until then, in any case, the United States will be paralyzed. This is the first point.

The second point is Mr. Putin's waiting stance. The third point is the disagreement of the European Union and the inability to have any impact. And finally, the fourth point is that as we have seen, one of the warring parties in the region is not interested in a ceasefire, I do not want to talk about it again.

As for medium-term, long-term prospects, the only small possibility I can imagine, which I have talked about for several years, is that in response to Azerbaijan's final renunciation of Karabakh, that is, the reunification of Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia, including the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan will be allowed to have an autonomous corridor, not independent, of course, but an autonomous corridor south of the Meghri corridor, along the Araks, so that Azerbaijan can have a direct connection with Nakhichevan, western Azerbaijan.

I emphasize again that I am talking about an autonomous corridor that would remain under Armenian rule. But you know, corridors, as long as they are under control, are not problematic, it is not a change of borders.

But as to what I offer, I do not know at all, whether it is feasible, I am absolutely not sure that Azerbaijan will be ready for it. I think that Armenia will be more ready to consider that option, but I do not think that Azerbaijan is ready for that now. And I will say that in the beginning, unfortunately, at the moment, in the short term, this conflict is inevitable.

The Armenian authorities are calling on foreign states to recognize Karabakh's independence and right to self-determination. Is this realistic?

No, I do not believe in this at all. I do not believe it for two reasons.

The first reason is related to trade relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In other words, the same states that hesitate to recognize the Armenian Genocide, or which did not do so due to possible Turkish opposition, will not recognize Karabakh. This is indisputable.

The second point, which is more important, is that countries like France, which, however, are objectively very friendly towards Armenia, will not do it. Because they are states that do not want to recognize the separatism or self-determination of a state that belongs to another state in international law. I say this even if I believe that in international law, from that point of view, the people of Karabakh have a real legal argument.

In other words, it is part of the USSR that the Stalinist annexation took place, and Karabakh, as everyone knows, has always been inhabited by Armenians. But that argument is minority opinion. This argument does not have enough weight in the face of the most sacred argument of state sovereignty, according to which states have an exclusive right to their entire territory. This might have changed if an international referendum on independence in Karabakh had been organized. I am not saying that it would completely change the situation, but it would, unfortunately, allow us to make some progress.

But, unfortunately, at the moment, in the short term, I do not believe in any state recognizing Karabakh's independence.

To summarize, how long do you think the war will last?

Unfortunately, I think this is a war of attrition. Even if Azerbaijan cannot win, in any case this is my opinion, maybe I am wrong or I hope I am not wrong, but I think that Azerbaijan cannot break through the defense front, crush the Karabakh forces, push back the Armenians to the Meghri corridor.

I do not have the impression that Azerbaijan has that ability. But if Azerbaijan does not have that opportunity, the danger is that we may have a war of attrition.

And the problem here is that in a war like this, economically, financially, as well as demographically, let's not forget that Azerbaijan has more resources. This does not mean that success is guaranteed them. However, this signifies that the means are more significant, that there is a danger that the Armenian side will soon be exhausted.

So, unfortunately, I think this is going to be a war of attrition.